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1. Introduction 
The winner’s curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983; Milgrom and Weber 1982) represents 
an inefficiency in auction mechanisms, and an economic loss for the winner incurring it. For this 
reason, the economics literature has studied the issue widely in order to understand the 
mechanisms through which it arises. As the next section will show, not only is this phenomenon 
pervasive throughout all the sectors in which auctions are used, but its causes are still not precisely 
known. For these reasons, the present article aims to shed some light on whether the phenomenon 
may depend on the magnitude of the potential loss, a point which the literature has not addressed. 
In other words, a non-tested hypothesis which this paper aims to test is whether people are less 
prone to bid high, and consequently to incur the risk of overbidding, when the value, and therefore 
the winning bid, of the auctioned item is high. The hypothesis tested in this article is that people 
become more and more cautious as the potential loss increases. Indeed, relatively high bids may 
depend on the individual’s utility of winning per se (Malhotra 2010). However, as the damage (i.e. 
the winner’s curse) caused by paying more for the auction item than its market value increases, the 
willingness to incur such a loss should become weaker and weaker. The absolute size of the winner’s 
curse is likely to increase with the value of the auctioned item, and thus the willingness to overbid 
(and consequently the winner’s curse) should decrease with it. The reasoning behind this hypothesis 
follows the work of Bowman et al. (1999), Kahneman (2003) and Vendrik and Woltjer (2007), who 
theorise that individuals have value functions that are convex for losses. To investigate this, the 
present article proposes an experiment based on a modified dollar game (see Shubik 1971 for the 
original design and Migheli 2015 for the modified setting), in which the two treatments used are 
such that in one case the potential loss is much larger than in the other.  
This paper contributes to the extant literature in three respects: 1) it queries whether the 
winner’s curse depends (negatively) on the (absolute magnitude of the) potential loss; 2) it sheds 
light on the causes of the winner’s curse, suggesting that it may arise also from non-irrational 
behaviours; and 3) it uses an experimental technique in a field (auctions) in which this approach is 
still largely underused.  
The results show that the winner’s curse occurs only in the treatment in which the potential 
loss is small. In the other treatment, all the bids are consistent with the hypothesis of rationality and 
are within the range that characterises the Nash equilibrium of the modified dollar auction (Migheli 
2015). We can therefore conclude that the subjects understand the magnitude of the potential loss 
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and take their decisions accordingly, reducing their bids, and consequently the probability of 
incurring the winner’s curse and its intensity, when the loss is potentially high.   
 
2. Related literature 
The economics literature on auctions has studied this phenomenon extensively. Apparently 
in the most of the auctions the winner overpays for the item won. In general, this phenomenon 
occurs in auctions with incomplete information, in which the winning bid is higher than the value of 
the item auctioned either because its characteristics are different from those expected by the 
winner, or because s/he does not know the exact market value of that item (Thaler 1988). Chowdhry 
and Sherman (1996) propose a theoretical model showing that the winner’s curse in IPOs can be 
mitigated, but not avoided. There the curse arises as a consequence of asymmetric information 
between the investors and the investee. A recent experiment (Schnitzlein and Shao 2013) confirms 
this prediction and highlights that the winner’s curse emerges in the absence of complete 
information; moreover, under this condition, the curse persists over time (i.e. when the auction is 
repeated more than once with the same subjects). In other words, the bidders apparently do not 
learn from the past. More recently, Hendricks et al. (2008) elaborated on a theoretical model to 
analyse the emergence of the winner’s curse in common value auctions. They show that ‘the trading 
inefficiency caused by the “winner’s curse” can be an important obstacle to collusion in auctions of 
common value assets.’1 In other words, their model suggests that the winner’s curse is not always 
a negative feature (as, in this case, it prevents collusion which is likely to occur in ascending auctions 
(Cramton 1998)) although it is generally a consequence of asymmetric information between the 
auctioneer and the bidders.  
Several empirical works have so far highlighted (and sometimes quantified) the winner’s 
curse in auctions. Relying on the theoretical framework of Broecker (1990) and Nakamura (1993), 
Shaffer (1998) treats the functioning of the market of bank lending as a sort of auction (indeed very 
close to a sealed-bid mechanism). She empirically shows that a phenomenon analogous to the 
winner’s curse explains (part of) the adverse selection observed in the market of bank loans. In 
considering the same market from a theoretical point of view, von Thadden (2004) shows that with 
asymmetric information, some winner’s curse occurs in equilibrium. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) 
                                                          
1 Hendricks et al. (2008), p. 1034. 
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analyse a dataset of coin auctions on eBay, and find that the winner generally overpays for the coin; 
through simulations the authors also show that that the winner’s curse decreases with the number 
of bidders. This outcome suggests that as the number of bids increases, so does the information 
about the ‘true’ value of the auctioned item, minimising the risk of incurring the winner’s curse and 
the magnitude of it. Goeree and Offerman (2003) find that ‘the effects of the winner’s curse are 
mitigated by a news curse and loss or risk aversion’2, but they still are present in a number of second-
price auctions. This may indicate that the winner’s curse is not a matter of learning from the past, 
but rather the result of personal attitudes towards risk or of exogenous information (such as the 
value of the others’ bids) provided during the auction. However, the extent of the curse is likely to 
depend also on the auction mechanism that is implemented (Che and Gale 1996; Klemperer 1998) 
and on the experience of the bidders (Harrison and List 2008). In the domain of public procurement 
where sealed-bid auctions are the most commonly used mechanism, Athias and Nuñez (2008) find 
the occurrence of the winner’s curse in a sample of 49 worldwide roads concessions3.  
The reasons behind the emergence of the winner’s curse are not completely clear. On the 
one hand, it appears as an outcome of bounded rationality (Chrisman et al. 2014). On the other 
hand, there may be non-economic reasons why we observe the phenomenon. Goetzmann and 
Spiegel (1995) suggest that the winner’s curse may in fact represent (at least partially) the difference 
between the private value and the market value of the item, rather than the consequence of 
bidders’ inconsistent beliefs (Ivanov et al. 2010).  Recent articles (such as Parlour et al. 2007) claim 
that the bidders incur the winner’s curse because of their inability to compute the equilibrium price, 
even when they are aware of the possibility of incurring the curse. However, this evidence may have 
other explanations. Van den Bos et al. (2008) propose a ‘social origin’ for the winner’s curse. Their 
experiments show that this is not caused by bidders’ irrationality: when the other bidder(s) is (are) 
a PC(s), then the bids approach the value of the auctioned item, whereas this is not the case (i.e. 
the winner’s curse appears) when the humans bid against other humans. This ‘suggests that humans 
assign significant future value to victories over humans.’4 In other words, the bidders get satisfaction 
(utility) from the simple fact of winning against other human opponents, and, therefore, are 
rationally willing to pay for this non-monetary value. In particular, Shefrin (2002) highlights that the 
                                                          
2 Goeree and Offerman (2003), p. 625. 
3 Other scholars (see for example Amaral et al. 2009; Bohem and Olaya 2006) have been concerned with the winner’s 
curse and its effects on public procurement. However, they all have proposed reforms to the existing regulation to solve 
the problem.  
4 Van der Bos et al. (2008), p. 483. 
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willingness to pay for satisfying one’s ego is particularly evident in the one-dollar game (Shubik 
1971) in which people accept sure losses just to win the auction. In addition, this occurs even when 
escalation is ruled out in a modified one-dollar auction (Migheli 2012).  
People therefore appear willing to accept a monetary loss (defined as the difference 
between the price paid for the item won and its market value) to enjoy the satisfaction of a victory. 
Although people tend to prefer probable large losses to smaller certain losses (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) in common value English auctions, the gain/loss for the highest bidder is, in a sense, 
certain. Indeed, people bid to win, and therefore they are ready to accept the difference between 
the bid and the market value of the object, whatever its sign (i.e. whether a gain or a loss) and 
magnitude. However, as the value of the potential loss increases, people may be less willing to bear 
the risk to feed their ego. Auctions that feature losses are typical of public procurements. Here the 
cost of preparing and submitting an offer (bid) may be very high, as it may involve following 
committer-specific requirements, projecting a dam, designing a particular military aircraft, etc. Most 
of these costs get sunk if somebody else wins the contract. In this article, therefore, the winner’s 
curse is interpreted, at least partially, as the bidder’s willingness to pay to win and to get satisfaction 
from the victory. In order to rule out other possible interpretations—for example, different private 
values between the bidders, the presence of private information about the item auctioned, 
misperception of its true market value, and other sources of asymmetric information—the item 
auctioned must have an objective common value. For this reason, a modified dollar auction, in which 
a current coin is auctioned, has been implemented. 
Another strand of literature has investigated how cognitive mechanisms may affect the 
emergence of the winner’s curse in auctions. Ball et al. (1991) show that learning has no effect on 
the phenomenon, which is present also among people who have experienced repeated bilateral 
auctions and have suffered from the winner’s curse. Foreman and Murnighan (1996) find exactly 
the same results, and conclude that the winner’s curse is pervasive and extremely persistent also 
when learning is possible. A study by Valley et al. (1998) shows that the phenomenon arises with 
the same probability and intensity both when the auction is face-to-face and when the bids are sent 
in written form to the counterpart without physical interaction. More recently, Charness and Levin 
(2009) have performed an experiment using a simplified version of the acquiring-a-company game; 
they too show that the winner’s curse is a consequence of bounded rationality rather than of 
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seeking non-economic payoffs. These results suggest that bidders may not be able to avoid the 
winner’s curse simply by learning from repeatedly participating in auctions.   
This article uses a common value sealed-bid auction to test whether the size of the potential 
loss (in absolute value) can mitigate the winner’s curse. In other words, the aim of the experiment 
proposed is to test whether the risk of large losses induces more conservative bids. Why should we 
expect such an outcome? The satisfaction of winning an auction is a prize and has a price. When the 
expected loss becomes larger than this price, or than the willingness to pay for the victory, then a 
rational agent should refrain from overpaying and—with complete information, and if the value of 
the item auctioned is common to all the bidders—the winner’s curse should disappear. To ensure 
that the value of the auctioned item is really common to all the participants, a one-euro coin and a 
twenty-euro5 banknote are auctioned. To avoid the possibility that escalation may drive the results 
(Shubik 1971)6, a sealed-bid mechanism is enforced. The results show that when the value of the 
auctioned item is low, the winner is ‘cursed’, whereas for the (relatively) large value of €20nobody 
bid more than the face value of the banknote.  
Gender is relevant in the domain of risk aversion (Borghans et al. 2009) and therefore in the 
domain of auctions (Ham and Kagel 2006). In particular, women are typically found to be more risk-
averse than men (see also Croson and Gneezy 2009), and therefore they might be expected to be 
less likely to incur the winner’s curse. In other words, according to the empirical evidence found so 
far, women should bid lower than men and this is what it is reasonably expected to be observed 
also in the results of the experiment presented in this article.   
 
3. Methodology 
This section provides information about the subjects who participated in the experiment and 
the design of it. 
 
                                                          
5 Twenty euro is not a large amount of money in absolute terms. However, with respect to the aims of this paper (i.e. 
considering the nature of the experimental subjects), the difference between €1 and €20 is large enough to be 
significant, as will be clear from section 2.  
6 Although escalation in Shubik’s auction is likely to be engendered by the particular mechanism of that auction, there 
is no clear evidence to discard this possibility when other mechanisms are used. Therefore, a sealed-bid auction seems 
the cleanest design as possible for the aims of this article.   
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3.1. Participants 
The subjects were 76 undergraduate students from an Italian School of Political Science. Thirty-
one of them were males, and 45 females. All of them were regular students, aged between 19 and 
22. However, the precise age of each participant was not recorded. The recruitment procedure 
involved paper advertising in the building of the school two weeks before the experiment. There 
was no information about its content; it was just an invitation to participate in an experiment. The 
interested students enrolled by using an online procedure that ensured anonymity. There were two 
sessions; 40 students signed up for the first and 36 for the second. The students self-allocated to 
the sessions; they chose which section to enrol in according to their availability. As no information 
was provided about the object of the experiment, it is reasonable to assume that the participants 
did not choose a specific session because of particular expectations about the content of that 
session. Although bids may be sensitive to the total number of participants (Gneezy and 
Smorodinsky 2006), they did not know their exact number of opponents. They did see the 
opponents of the session in which they participated; however, the visual difference between 36 and 
40 people is very small and should not have biased the results.  
3.2. Experimental design and procedure 
The experiment is based on a modified one-dollar auction in which bids are sealed to avoid 
escalation. In the original setting (Shubik 1971) a one-dollar banknote is auctioned; the bidder with 
the highest bid wins the dollar and pays the bid, while the bidder with the second highest bid pays 
the bid, without receiving anything in exchange. Once the two participants have bid a positive 
amount, the design of the auctions engenders escalation aimed at minimising the loss. Indeed, the 
person with the second highest bid is certain to incur a loss equal to his bid, while the person with 
the highest bid has a gain equal to the difference between the dollar auctioned and the bid. 
However, as the two highest bids increase, the loss for the former person increases. When the 
highest bid reaches the value of one dollar, the person with the second highest bid has an incentive 
to overbid, although his bid will exceed the value of the auctioned item. The reason behind this is 
that bidding $1.01 generates a loss of $0.01 if the bidder wins the auction. Stopping at $0.99 would 
generate a loss of $0.99, as this bid is the second highest bid (we hypothesised that the highest bid 
had reached $1). At this point the person who bid $1 is the one with the second highest bid, and 
therefore will lose the dollar, unless s/he bids $1.02 to win the auction and to minimise the loss 
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(reducing it from $1 to $0.02). This process of loss minimisation continues until one of the two 
highest bidders stops, generally because s/he cannot bid more.   
The setting used in this article retains the three main of the original design. Namely, it 
produces three outcomes: 1) the winner pays the bid and takes the coin (or the banknote); 2) the 
person with the second highest bid pays the bid and receives nothing (i.e. he suffers a net loss equal 
to his bid—which can also be zero); 3) all the other participants do not pay and do not receive 
anything. This scheme ensures the existence of at least one loser (two if the highest bid exceeds the 
value of the auctioned object). The main difference with respect to the original design is that the 
English auction on which it is based is transformed in a sealed-envelope auction. In other words, the 
bidders place their offer in a sealed envelope and then they hand it to the experimenter. This 
procedure avoids overbidding due to the escalation process as previously explained, and allows for 
isolating the pure winner’s curse (if any). It is possible to notice that, also in this modified dollar 
auction, the expected value of the game for each player depends then on the difference between 
the bid and the value auctioned (and this is private information as the bids are sealed), and on the 
others’ bids (and this is no one’s information as long as the envelopes containing the bids have not 
been opened).  
Two treatments are implemented: in the first the auctioned item is a one-euro coin (low 
value), and in the second it is a twenty-euro banknote (high value). The value of the coin and that 
of the banknote are common and evident to all the bidders and the auctioned ‘item’ is shown to all 
of them before the experiment. The subjects are therefore well aware of what the auction is about 
and they see that the object is actually ready to be delivered to the winner immediately at the end 
of the auction when the winner is individuated. If some people are willing to overpay for the 
coin/banknote in such a setting, the difference between their bid and the value of the 
coin/banknote is interpretable as the price that they are willing to pay to win the auction. Indeed, 
there is no hidden information about the market value of the item auctioned, which is evident to 
(and equal for) all the participants. The experiment used in my analysis assumes and enforces a 
direct and positive correlation between the potential loss and the potential gain. In other words, 
the assumption is that the higher the value of the procurements the larger the possible losses (either 
because they require larger initial investments, or because their execution might be more complex 
or because of both). 
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The two sessions took place on the same day. The participants in each session were gathered 
together in the same classroom and the experimenter read them the instructions. Each participant 
also received a printed copy of these instructions. In order to make the loss as realistic as possible, 
the participants were not given any show-up fee, nor did the experiment involve any initial task for 
the participants to earn money. They were informed that they would have to pay their bids using 
their pocket money. Of course, this means that the bidders have now budgets, which differ from 
each other and are constrained to the money available in their pockets. However, from a 
questionnaire filled in after the experiment, the questionnaire indicates that the average pocket 
money in the sample was €58.12. Only one subject had less than €20 in his pocket in the second 
session; this observation was deleted. €20 represents 34.41% of the average amount, and, in this 
sense, it has significant value for the experimental subjects. Moreover, this also shows that all the 
participants but one had enough money to bid in the respective session. It is important to stress 
here that in real auctions the bidders actually have individual budget constraints. Therefore, this 
characteristic of the experiment mirrors reality and helps to get cleaner results.  
Before writing their bid on paper and putting it in the envelope, the subjects answered 
control questions to check whether everyone understood the mechanism of the game. After 
ascertaining that no doubts about the rules existed, the participants started writing their bids on 
the paper provided, and then they put them in a numbered7 envelope, sealed the envelope and 
gave it to the experimenter. To avoid the possibility that they could look at somebody else’s choice, 
four voting-booth-like cabins were prepared. Each participant wrote the bid inside one of these, and 
then the subjects, who had already bid, gathered in a separate space in the classroom. They entered 
the booth in no particular order: they were just told that, once the bid was decided, they had to 
enter the cabin, write it on the paper and seal it while inside. The winner of each session was 
announced publicly at the end of the session while all the participants were still in the room. The 
first and second highest bidders paid and the winner received the coin (or the banknote) in front of 
the others.  
At the end of each session, the subjects filled in a questionnaire aimed at collecting usual 
socio-demographic characteristics and some additional information about the participant’s beliefs 
during the auction. In particular, the questionnaire asked the subjects whether they were afraid to 
                                                          
7 Each subject was given a paper with a number and a numbered envelope. They had to keep the paper with the number, 
which constituted the only identification for the experimenter.  
 10
end second and thus have to pay without receiving anything back. There were four possible answers 
to the question ‘why have you decided to bid this amount?: 1) ‘Because I wanted to win’; 2) ‘because 
I feared ending second’; 3) ‘because I did not want to bid more’ and 4) ‘because the outcome of the 
auction was uncertain.’ The aim of this question is to capture—at least to some extent—the reason 
why people bid what they bid. 
4. Results 
Figures 1 and 2 display the distributions of the bids in absolute value for the two auctions. 
We can notice that in the first treatment (€1) two bids are higher than the auctioned value (i.e. two 
people are willing to overpay for the euro and therefore incur the winner’s curse), whereas in the 
second treatment no bid exceeds the €20 auctioned. A second observation is that the distribution 
of the bids in the second treatment is more left-skewed than in the first. In other words, the two 
distributions are apparently different. However, the absolute values are not comparable as the 
auctioned items were very different. To make this comparison possible, the bids are normalised 
over the value auctioned. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions reveals that the 
two distributions are actually different at a 99% confidence level.   
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Figure 1. Distribution of bids under treatment 1 (1 euro coin)
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It is also possible to observe that in the one-euro auction, the average bid amounted to 
74.3% of the value of the auctioned item, while this figure is reduced to 11.59% when the 20-euro 
banknote was auctioned. This is the first confirmation that potentially large losses discourage 
people from bidding high percentages of the auctioned item’s value.  
Table 1 presents the average bids both in absolute (first row) and in relative (second row) 
terms. We notice that, while the average bid amounted to 74.30% in the first treatment, it 
decreased to 11.59% in the second. Even considering only the bids less than or equal to the value 
of the item auctioned (third row of table 1), the difference is large and statistically significant 
(61.97% vs 11.59%). The same holds for bids that are less than 100% of the value of the item 
auctioned (fourth row of table 1). This provides evidence related to the fact that higher stakes which 
require higher bids may generate larger losses and that people are less willing to bid large shares of 
the auctioned value. Whereas the victory may bring satisfaction (utility) to the winner, as the 
potential loss increases, the bids decrease (in relative value). This is also interpretable in terms of 
risk premiums: as the potential loss increases in absolute terms, the same happens to the potential 
gain (equal to the difference between €20 and the bid). What is very interesting here is that the 
winner’s curse, which is present in the first treatment, disappears in the second. Here there are two 
bids as high as €20 (i.e. 100% of the auctioned value), but nobody offered more.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of bids under treatment 2 (20 euro note)
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Let now analyse the results of the questionnaire. One of the questions asked the participants 
why they did not bid more than they actually did. Under the first treatment (€1 coin), only 8.33% of 
the sample answered that they feared ending second and suffering a net loss, whereas 34.48% of 
the subjects gave this answer in the second treatment (table 1). This means that they were more 
concerned about the loss when it could have been8 larger. Although previous research has found 
females to be more risk-averse than males (Croson and Gneezy 2009), in this experiment both 
genders were equally concerned about being second (consistent with this, also the normalised bids 
are not statistically different between genders). The winner’s curse disappears as the bidders 
become more concerned about the possibility of losing. Or better, the larger the possible loss in 
absolute value, the more concerned the subjects are about it. It is important to stress here that, 
although the price of the victory might be fixed (for example €2), the potential loss of bidding €22 
(the value auctioned plus the price of the victory) is much higher than when bidding €3.  
 
                                                          
8 Notice that, in principle, there is no reason why the loss should be larger in the second than in the first auction. Should 
all the subjects bid less than €1 in the second, whereas should somebody bid more than €1 in the first, the potential 
loss would be larger in the first than in the second treatment.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Standard errors in brackets
Average bid (in euro) 0.74 2.32
(0.088) (0.602)
Average normalised bid (%) 74.30 11.59
(8.846) (3.010)
Average normalised bid (%) for bids < 100% 
of the auctioned value
52.46 8.91 ***
(6.826) (1.414)
Average normalised bid (%) for bids ≤ 100% 
of the auctioned value
61.97 11.59 ***
(6.343) (3.010)
Percentage of males 32.50 46.87
(7.642) (8.963)
Aim at winning (%) 7.69 6.25
(4.32) (4.35)
Fear to be second (%) 8.33 35.48
(4.67) (8.64)
Paid maximum amount (%) 61.11 19.36
(8.24) (7.21)
Outcome uncertain (%) 13.89 25.81
(5.85) (7.99)
Observations
1
40 36
1 Three people did not answer the questionnaire.
n.s.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Significance
not meaningful
***
n.s.
n.s.
***
***
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 Table 2 presents the normalised bids by gender and by treatment. The table shows also that 
the figures presented in each column are statistically different from each other at the 1% level; while 
no such a difference may be detected when we compare the figures presented in each row of the 
table. In other words, different from what was expected, no gender difference is detected. 
Moreover, while the difference is as expected in the one-euro treatment (where the females bid 
less than the males), the outcome is the opposite in the twenty-euro treatment. These results are 
consistent with what is highlighted by figures 1 and 2 and with the findings presented in table 3: 
people bid significantly less when the magnitude of the potential loss is large than when it is small. 
Moreover, there is no gender difference between the bids in each of the two treatments.    
 
Table 3 presents a tobit analysis of the normalised bids. This regression censors normalised 
bids at 0% and clusters the observations by treatment. Moreover, it accounts for the fact that we 
are dealing with risky choices, and therefore some participants might be willing to pay negative 
prices, but of course, the bids have a floor at €0. Here the answers to the questionnaire are used as 
controls. The results show that believing that one is second has a strong negative effect on the 
normalised bids, whereas the subjects who aimed to win bid significantly more than the reference 
category (the subjects who reported that they had submitted their maximum willingness to pay). As 
already highlighted, no significant gender effect is present in the sample. A second specification 
includes also the information about having a job or not (variable working student in the table). 
Indeed, the presence of a wage may influence the bid. The coefficient for this variable is positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that receiving a wage increases the (normalised) bid. The 
other controls remain significant.  
Table 2. Bids (as percentage of the value of the auctioned item) by
gender and by treatment. Standard errors in brackets. 
Males Females Significance
One euro tratment 86.77 70.15
(12.07) (12.02)
Twenty euro treatment 9.59 14.70
(2.72) (5.46)
Significance *** ***
*** Significant at 1% level; ° non-significant at any conventional level
°
°
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5. Conclusions 
The experiment presented in this article shows the existence of an important trade-off 
between risk premiums and the value of winning an auction. In particular, in light of the extant 
literature on the psychological benefits of winning a contest, any observed winner’s curse in a 
sealed-bid dollar auction is interpretable as the bidder’s willingness to pay to secure the victory. Of 
course, in the presence of asymmetric information, there are other causes of the winner’s curse, 
but the modified dollar auction presented here rules out any possible informative asymmetry both 
between the auctioneer and the bidders, and with respect to the market value of the item 
auctioned. The results highlight the presence of a clear trade-off between the price of the victory 
and the risk premium. This does not mean that by increasing the value of the item auctioned, the 
winner’s curse will disappear (there is evidence that this is actually not the case). Rather, this article 
provides evidence for the existence of some willingness to pay for winning and shows that this 
component of the winner’s curse tends to disappear as the possible sunk costs increase.  
This result is particularly relevant in the field of public procurement where the very nature 
of that market is likely to make the bidders run at a loss. Here there are good reasons to hypothesise 
Specification 1 Specification 2
Male -0.87 -0.30
(16.02) (12.45)
Aimed at winning 47.03 60.59
(22.10)** (19.84)***
Feared to be second -49.92 -44.75
(15.73)*** (15.08)***
Outcome uncertain -2.62 3.05
(22.09) (14.25)
Working student 24.75
(0.84)***
Constant 52.96 39.41
(19.44)*** (19.84)**
Observations: 76 76
Pseudo R-squared: 0.012 0.017
Log pseudo-likelihood: -346.54 -344.74
Left-censored observations: 10 10
** Significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Table 3. Normalised bids and individual characteristics: tobit estimation with 
clustered standard errors (s. e. in brackets)
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that winning a contract also has a positive payoff in terms of image. The company, which supplies 
the US Air Force One, or the Marine One, may indeed accept to run at a loss on that specific project, 
as the return in terms of prestige and image will be large enough to compensate for the monetary 
loss. This is a sort of ‘free’ advertising about the quality of the products of the winner which is likely 
to have a positive impact on the winning company’s revenues. Moreover, the potential loss on such 
small contracts is likely small in absolute terms. However, there are procurements that involve much 
larger expected revenues, and also much larger potential losses, both if the initial investment 
(projecting, in some cases lobbying, etc.) gets sunk and/or the implementation of the project gets 
complex. The evidence presented in this article suggests that subjects may be willing to incur the 
winner’s curse voluntarily when this is small in absolute terms, whereas this is no longer the case if 
the potential loss is large enough to compensate for the benefit of winning. Going back to public 
procurement, this means that we should expect companies’ bids to overpay for small contracts, but 
to be closer to the true value of the contract as its magnitude increases.  
Some discussion about the cognitive processes behind the differences presented in the 
tables is worthy. The results of the experiment presented in this article show that, different from 
what has been found in the existing literature so far, a cognitive process is at work. While the 
experiment presented here does not allow for understanding whether repeated participation in the 
game has any effect on an individual’s behaviour, bidders seem to adjust their bids to the magnitude 
of the potential loss. This reduces the probability of incurring the winner’s curse. Johnson et al. 
(2002) performed an experiment involving repeated auctions which was aimed at measuring how 
much the subjects learn from the past. They observed that even after several repetitions of the 
game, the offers were still far away from the equilibrium value, thereby suggesting the presence of 
the winner’s curse. In other words, it is loss aversion rather than learning which affects a bidder’s 
behaviour, thus reducing the probability of incurring the winner’s curse. While learning is a cognitive 
process by definition, some research has shown that loss aversion also results from a cognitive 
process (Fraser-Mackenzie et al. 2015; Tom et al. 2007). Thus, from this perspective, it is possible to 
argue that the disappearance of the winner’s curse in the €20 auction results from a cognitive 
process mediated by loss aversion. Yechiam and Hochman (2013) suggest that this is the reason why 
this may be observed in the experimental setting proposed in this paper, since the winner’s curse is 
generally present in all auction mechanisms. In their paper these authors show that cognitive 
processes in auctions emerge from experiencing losses. Generally, Dutch and English auctions do 
not involve direct losses. Indeed, although incurring the winner’s curse means suffering a loss, the 
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satisfaction of winning and the hedonic characteristics of the item won mitigate, and perhaps hide), 
the sense of loss. On the contrary, when the latter is sizeable and visible (as in the one-dollar game), 
it activates cognitive mechanisms, which decrease the probability of incurring the winner’s curse.  
With respect to the possible cognitive processes which are at work in auctions, the results of 
this paper contribute to the extant literature by showing that cognitive processes are activated 
through loss aversion and that the effects of the latter increase with the magnitude of the loss. This 
outcome does not allow for a conclusion that loss aversion may lead to the winner’s curse 
disappearing from auctions. However, further research is necessary to understand whether and how 
it is possible to activate and foster cognitive processes which may also mitigate the rise of the 
winner’s curse in auctions different from the one-dollar game. Possible extensions of the research 
in this field may exploit agent-based simulations (see Scalco et al. 2015) to understand: 1) how the 
winner’s curse decreases as the value of the potential loss increases, and 2) how agents learn from 
loss aversion and from losses suffered in the past. 
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